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CanadaHUBS AND SPOKES, AND FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS
by Carsten Kowalczyk and Ronald J. Wonnacott
In August, 1992, Canada, Mexico and the United States presented a free
trade agreement (FTA) to cover a North American market with a combined GNP
approaching $7 trillion and an annual trade in goods and services among its
members exceeding $270 billion.
Although this agreement is essentially in a trilateral PTA format, full
ratification by all three countries is not guaranteed. If Canada were not to ratify,
the result could be a Mexico-U.S. bilateral ETA, creating a hub-and-spoke
system in which the United States as the hub would have one bilateral spoke
agreement with Canada (the 1989 Canada-U.S. PTA), and another with Mexico;
in other words, two free trade areas overlapping on the United StatesJ
*Dnouth College and NBER, and University of Western Ontario,
respectively. Without implicating them in the final result, we should like to
thank Ron Jones, Anne Krueger and Jeffrey Schoti along with participants in a
workshop at the University of Rochester and a conference in Washington
sponsored by the C.D. Howe Institute and the National Planning Association
(Hill, 1991). This work has been supported in part by a Haney Research Grant
and a Rockefeller Grant to Dartmouth College.
1 Tosome extent a hub-and-spoke system has already developed given the free
trade agreement between Israel and the U.S. There are other possible outcomes
that would require the analysis of this paper. One is that the United States
would fail to ratify an agreement with Mexico while a Canada-Mexico agreement
succeeds. This time the hub would be Canada with a Mexican and a U.S. spoke.
While this possibility is theoretically interesting, it is hardly of practical
relevance as it would be a virtually certain non-starter in Canada. We focus,
therefore, on the situation of a U.S. hub. Another outcome requiring this sort of
analysis would be an agreement with bilateral hub-and-spoke provisions in
certain sectors grafted onto a trilateral free trade core in all other sectors.
2Moreover, the United States might go on to negotiate additional bilaterals with
Chile and other countries in the hemisphere.
While there has been a great deal of analysis of the economics of a
simple ETA, far less is known about the more complex economics when F1'As
overlap in a hub-and-spoke system.2 This paper examines the welfare effects on
a nation that participates in the development of a hub-and-spoke system, and
compares them to the effects from participating in a simple, expanding FTA.
Using the now familiar North American case as our example, we show that the
expectation for any spoke --Canathor Mexico --isthat its welfare would be less
in a hub-and spoke system. At the same time, if the analysis is limited to the
effects of preferential trading, then the preferred access by the U.S. hub tospoke
markets likely will lead it to favor a hub-and-spoke system. However, this
judgment by the U.S. will be tempered by broader influences, such as the effect
of a hub-and-spoke system in generating smaller increases in income in the
spoke markets, and hence a smaller increase in U-S. exports; and in generating
higher administrative, transportation, and rent-seeking costs. These and other
considerations can be expected to make a hub-and-spoke system less beneficial
for all participants, thus leading each spokecountry to favor an FTA more
2 Theoverlapping ETA or hub-and -spoke concept is the same as the two-sided
triangle examined in Wonnacott (1975 and 1982). It is also essentially the same
problem as the U.S. star with partner countries at the points described by Yung
C. Park and Jung Ho Yoo (1989). To our knowledge, it was first called the hub-
and-spoke problem in independent studies by Richard Lipsey (1990, pp. 4-5) and
Wonnacott (1990, pp. 3-4). Lipsey examined it again in 1991, and Wonnacott
(1991) provided a detailed statement of some of the issues involved. The
problem was considered further in Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1991).
3strongly, and arguably even leading the hub country to reverse its judgment and
also favor an ETA.3
Potential applications of this analysis include not only the extension of
free trade to othercountriesin the Western Hemisphere but also the creation of
complex regional trading structures in Europe, for example among nations in
Eastern and Western Europe or between the former republics of the old Soviet
Union. Will some of these countries become spokes for the EC hub as Poland
and Hungary now seem to be doing? Will Russia become an EC spoke, or will
it become another hub with bilateral spoke agreements with previous Soviet
Republics? Or will it do both? Before such a maze of new trading
configurations is created --indeedis even considered --itis important to sort out
the economics of hub-and-spoke systems, and how any such system would
compare to the obvious, much simpler option: a plurilateral ETA covering the
same countries.
Section 1 of the paper discusses the traditional approach to customs
union theory. Section II presents the methodology used in our analysis. Sction
111 analyzes the economic effects as a hub-and-spoke system develops and
compares this system to a trilateral free trade agreement from the point of view
of the initial spoke, Canada. Section IV compares the two systems from the
3 Werecognize that the political fate of any negotiated agreement would depend
on the distribution of any gains and losses across interest groups, on these
groups' relative strengths, and on the political system's ability to transfer income
among them. While political economy considerations of this sort are important,
we believe that focussing on national welfare is useful, particularly at this early
stage of inquiry, as it helps identify how much income there is to be distributed
under each of the different trade regimes.
4perspective of the hub, the United States. Section V considers additional costs
related to the hub-and-spoke system such as those from rent-seeking activities.
Section VI, finally, summarizes and presents concluding remarks.
I. THE NORTH AMERICAN EXAMPLE: A HUB-AND-
SPOKE SYSTEM CENTERED ON THE UNITED
STATES, VS. A TRILATERAL CANADA-MEXICO.U.S.
FTA
Clearly, the interests of the U.S. hub will not be the same as those of
Canada or Mexico; nor will the interest of these two U.S. partners necessarily be
identical. This study uses terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects to examine
the effect on one U.S. partner --Canada--werea hub-and -spoke system to
develop.4 The result is then compared to the trilateral ETA alternative. These
two regimes are then compared from the point of view of the U.S. hub.
Answering the question of what happens to a spoke -.Canada--werea
hub-and-spoke system to develop involves two steps: (1) an examination of the
effect on Canada of its own bilateral with the United States; and (2) an analysis
of the effect on Canada as the U.S. goes on to sign a bilateral with Mexico,
thereby establishing a hub-and-spoke system.
To answer the question: "How would Canada compare this hub-and-
spoke outcome to a trilaterai FTA?" a final step is involvet (3) an analysis of
Terms of trade and volume of trade effects were introduced by Meade (1955).
They were treated formally by Jones (1969), and Ohyama (1972) applied them in
discrete form in an analysis of tax and tariff changes. Kowalczyk (1990) argued
that they constitute an attractive alternative to Viner's trade diversion and trade
creation effects and used them to derive new results.
5the effect on Canada if it were then to negotiate its own bilateral withMexico,
thus approximately creating a trilateral ETA.5
The effects on the U.S. hub involve examining these same threesteps
from the U.S. point of view.
The traditional analysis of preferential trade dates back to Viner (1950)
who introduced the concepts of trade diversion and creation. However,as
Kowalczyk (1990) has argued, these concepts --no matter how defined-- cannot
provide an adequate framework for an assessment of even a simple customs
union (CU), let alone a more complex preferential system like the one
investigated in this paper.6 Among the difficulties is that trade diversion has
two different definitions. Both include the terms-of-trade loss from switching
away from a cheaper outside source of imports to a more expensive union
partner. In addition, one of the definitions includes a volume of trade effect
indeed, using it, Gehrels (1956) and Lipsey (1957) showed that trade diversion
could be welfare improving. A further deficiency is that Viner's terminology is
not exhaustive, not en in very simple environments. For example, our
analysis suggests that Canath could experience more trade with the United States
if the latter were to sign a bilateral agreement with Mexico; neither of Viner's
terms would capture this appropriately.
It will be shown later that creating a trilateral is, in several respects, more
complicated than this; but this is a useful first approximation.
6 As elsewhere in theliterature, CU is defined here as a generic term to include
an PTA. We assume throughout the analysis that tariffs on non-member
countries remain constant. We assume also that non-member countries leave
their tariffs unchanged.
6II. THE MODEL
Assume throughout that production possibility sets are convex and
globally differentiable, and that each country has a welfare function that is also
globally differentiable. To begin, assume only two goods, clothing (C) and food
(F). The quantity of each consumed is Dc and Df, while the quantity of each
produced is Xc and Xf. At world price pe, which is the price of a unit of food
expressed in units of clothing, balanced trade implies that the value of the trading
nation's consumption bundle is equal to the value of its production bundle; that
is,
+ peDf =x<, +pexf
Differentiating this, along with appropriate manipulation, yields7
dy =-rndpe + (p ...pe) dm
7
Differentiating (1) yields:
dDc +pedDf÷ Dfdpe =dXc+pedxf+Xfdpe
Letting p be the price of food in the domestic market, add and subtractpdDf from
the left-hand side, and pdXf from the right-hand side.Then, noting that the
import of food is m =Df-Xfand that dxc +pdXf=0because (Xc, X) is a
point on the production possibility curve, (1') can be reduced to(2). This
derivation is in Caves, Frankel and Jones (1990),pp. 747-749.
7where p is the price of food in the domestic market, dy is the change in real
income evaluated at the original p. and m is the quantity of food imports.
To generalize this, interpret m as a vector of imports (including exports
with a negative sign). Vectors p and pe are then the corresponding domestic and
world prices of these tradeables. Finally, recognize that some of the effects of
tariff elimination (or even a fmite tariff reduction) may not be adequately captured
by infinitesimal marginal changes, so (2) must be integrated:
dy= -mdpe+(ppe). dm
fYI Jmi
where,for example, P1 and p are the values of pe when tariffs are, respectively,
at their initial value and at their final value.8
An example of an effect that just the differentiation in (2) would not
capture would occur if one country were to begin importing from its partner
rather than from a cheaper outside country that was initially its only source. In
this case, the first infinitesimally small reduction in its tariff against its partner
would have no effect. Indeed nothing would happen until its tariff reduction was
sufficient to initiate this change in country of origin of its imports.
8 Asan alternative to (3), finite changes may be evaluated using the difference
equation:
=- inapC +(p-pe).Am
8Hereafter we will, for the sake of the simplicity, be using equation(2),
whilerecognizing that the inner productand integration notation in (3) have been
dropped only for convenience, but are nonetheless implied throughout.
III.THE VIEW FROM A SPOKE: CANADA
Step One: The Canada-U.S. Bilateral
In a simple, hypothetical two-country world, the effectson
Canadian real income of Canada-U.S. free trade would be given by:
=- mc.Us dpe +(pe-pe)
I II
where mC,is the vector of Canadian tradables with the United States while p'
and pe are,respectively,the vectors of domestic Canadian prices and world
prices.
First,considerelement I of this equation the terms-of-trade effect
Canada willpayhigher prices for its imports from theUnitedStates because
Canadian tariffs are eliminated; similarly, Canada will receivea higher price for
its exports to the United States because of U.S. tariff elimination--withthe net
effect of these two changes being ambiguous. (It will be shown laterthat, in
viewofspecific conditions applying to Canada-U.S. trade, muchofthis
ambiguitycan be removed.)
9Element II --thevolume of trade effect --showsthe benefits to Canada
from an increase in its trade with the United States.9
In an n-country world, analyzing the effects of a bilateral Canada-
U.S. ETA requires recognition of trade with the rest of the world (ROW). Thus
equation (4), defining the increase in Canadian real income, must be expanded to
include elements Ill and LV below covering Canadian trade with ROW:
dyC =- mCiUS dpe + (pC -pe)dmC.
I 11
-mc,ROW dpe + (pC-pe)clmC.ROW
III IV
9 On theimport side, with a Canadian tariff creating a distortion between
domestic and foreign prices, the definition of elements I and II as the terms-of-
trade and volume-of-trade effects is straightforward. Some care, however, is
involved in the interpretation of what is happening on the export side, where, in
the absence of any Canadian export tax or subsidy, all export items in element II
become zero since each p' -pe=0. How is the benefit to Canada from increased
exports to be captured? The answer is: through term I. Figure 1, where x
denotes the Canadian export supply schedule and pCisthe relative price of x,
illustrates this for one good. Suppose that Canada has no export tax or subsidy
and that at the initial price p6 its exports to the U.S. are given by xc. After its
free trade agreement with the U.S. the price rises to pandCanadian exports
increase to xi. The benefit to Canada is given by area a+b+c, which can be
expressed by the integral,
x'5dp.
j p8
Along with similar expressions for other exports this makes up the export side
of term I in (4). We note that benefit a+b+c can be approximated by area a+b+d,
i.e. by i Apc.
10The effects on Canada of its ETA withthe UnitedStates can now be
evaluated as follows:
On the import side
A.As Canada extends preferential treatment to the United States,
Canada switches some of its import purchases from ROW to a
higher-cost U.S. source. This results in a terms-of-trade loss
(Ill). However,
B.This preferential, zero-tariff treatment of imports from the United
States lowers the Canadian domestic price. Under standard
assumptions there is an increase in imports, i.e., new imports
from the United States in II exceed the replaced imports from
ROW in IV. Since the resulting volume-of-trade benefit depends
on the differeQce in these two import flows, it is useful to think
of!! and IV together as;
(pC -pe) [dmC
US+ dnf' Row]
C.There is an increase in Canadian imports from the United States
in products in which the United States is the least-cost source.
This provides a volume-of-trade benefit in element II. However,
D.This increase in Canadian imports in C may also generate a
terms-of-trade loss in element I since Canada would be giving up
any previous terms-of-trade benefit from its own tariff on
imports from the United States.
11On the export side
E.Canada getsa terms-of-tradegain --alsoin element I --because
of removal of the U.S. tariff on Canadian exports.
F.Following footnote 9 above, this terms-of-trade gain on exports
in element I also includes the benefit from an increased volume
of Canadian exports to the United States --withthis effect being
augmented by the preference Canadian exporters receive in the
U.S. market in competition with third countries (a benefit that,
it will become evident, is very important in the Canadian case).
While the net effect of these six changes taken together is ambiguous in
theory, in practice, for the specific Canada-U.S. ETA case examined here, they
can be expected, on balance, to have a favorable effect on Canadian welfare. The
reason is that positive effect E is likely to exceed negative effect D, while
positive effects B, C and F are likely to exceed the only other negative effect A.
How can E be expected to dominate D when the tariffs the United States
would be removing in E are often smaller that the tariffs Canada would be
removing in D? The answer is that the prices of so many Canada-U.S. cradables
in manufacturing are determined in the U.S. market; i.e., in these products, the
United States is a classic large country, and Canada a small country. Because, in
such ttadables, Canada faces import prices fixed in the U.S. market, these prices
are unaffected by Canadian tariff removal; thus, in such cases, the negative effect
D disappears. On the other hand, on the large number of exports whose prices
are determined in the U.S. market, Canadian exporters get relief (i.e., higher
12post-duty prices) since they must no longer, directly or indirectly, pay a U.S.
tariff.10 Thus benefit E may be substantial and Canadacan expect an overall
terms of trade improvement)1
We propose, furthermore, that positive effects B, C and F are likely to
more than offset negative effect A.12 Specifically, the domain of A is Canada's
pre-FTA imports from the ROW which represent only 30% of Canada's imports.
The domain of welfare improving C is the remaining 70% of Canada'simports,
while the domain of welfare-improving F is the roughly 70% of Canadian
exports that go to the United States.
The resulting expectation that the Canada-U.S. ETA will, on balance,
benefit Canada has been supported by Cox and Harris (1986), who estimated that
an FTA with the United States would substantially increase Canadian real
income.'3 Indeed their studysuggested an even stronger conclusion: just the
10 The reliefwould only be partial in the selected manufacturedexports --e.g.,
telecommunications and transport equipment --whereCanada does have some
influence overprice. Also, Canada has some influence over internationalprices
in resource trade. It is difficult toargue, however, even in these limited sectors,
that Canada would suffer a significant terms-of-trade loss sincepre-FTA resource
tariffs by both countries have typically been low orzero. Moreover, Canadian
resource imports from the United States (on which price changes would damage
Canada) are substantially less than its resource exports to the United States (on
whichpricechanges would benefit Canada). In short, the conclusion that Canada
will get an overall terms-of-trade benefit from the ETAcan be expected to stand.
See Kowalczyk (1990) for an analysis of the first-best tradepolicy for a
small country.
12 Itwas exactly Gehrels' (op. cit.) and Lipsey's (op. cit.) point that even B
alone could dominate A.
13 In theirstudy, Cox and Harris estimated an increase in Canadian welfare in
the order of 9%. While this was subsequently revised downwardto reflect,
among other things, trade liberalization that had already taken place, their
estimate of gains still remained substantial and positive. Cox and Harris took
account of economies of scale, a major source of benefit to Canadianexporters
13benefit from acquiring preference in the U.S. market in a bilateral deal is so
important for Canada that it may make the ETA with the United States more
beneficial for Canada than even multilateral free trade would be. In other words,
the preferentialETA benefit for Canada (just part of F) could alone, zvughly
speaking, exceed not only any costs --inparticular in A --specificto the ETA,
but also any foregone benefits from free trade with the ROW that would be
available only from multilateral free tradej4
Step Two: A Mexico-U.S. Bilateral FTA
If the United States were to negotiate an ETA with Mexico alone, the
result would be a hub-and-spoke system in which the U.S. hub would have a
bilateral spoke agreement with Canada on the one hand, and with Mexico on the
other. The effect on Canada would be:
dyC =mc.Us dp +(pC-pe)dmC, US
I II
mC. M dpe + (pC -pe)dnf,M
III Iv
tnCt ROWdpe +(pC - pe)C, ROW
VI
not included in the analysis of this paper. Other investigators have also
estimated net gains, although usually with smaller numerical values; some of
these have also excluded scale economies.
14 Thereseem to be two inwitive and related explanations for this surprising
conclusion for Canada. The heavy concentration of its trade with the United
States ratherthanwith the ROW keeps the Canadian ETAlossA and the
potential benefit from free trade with the ROW under the GAIT relatively low;
and the large size of the U.S. market makes the benefits of preferential access
there relatively high. It should be emphasized that this is simply the view from
Canada. The effects on world welfare of these two regimes --aCanada-U.S.
bilateral vs. multilateral free trade --wouldof course be quite different.
14This is the same as equation (5) except that the earlier ROW is now decomposed
into Mexico M, and the remaining ROW.
A key issue now is whether, from Canada's viewpoint, the Mexico-
U.S. FTA is a complement or a substitute trade agreement.'5 An ETA is a
complement if it indreases imports by its members from outsiders; it is
substitute if it decreases those imports. To illustrate, an ETA will be a
complement if, for example, outsiders produce resources not available within the
ETA, and if increased trade between ETA members increases their demand for
such products from Outsiders. On the otherhand, an ETA will be a substitute if
outsiders produce goods that are substitutes for those produced within the ETA,
with purchases of these goods by ETA members from outsiders therefore being
reduced. For an ETA to be substitute it is important that this effect not be offset
by increased demand for outsiders' goods by the FTA members due to their
increased income generated by the formation of the ETA. This income effect is
potentially very important since, if it is strong enough, it can --understandard
assumptions --makea union complementary even if outsiders produce only
products that would otherwise be substitutes. It is, of course, possible that an
agreement may be a complement to one outside country, but a substitute to
another.16
15 Theseconcepts have been introduced in more detail in Kowalczyk and
Wonnacott (1991).
16 SeeKowalczyk and Wonnacott, op cit.
15If the Mexico-U.S. ETA is a substitute agreement from the point of
view of outsider Canada, with the exports of Canada to the United States and
Mexico falling as a consequence, then, noting footnote 9 above, there will be
damage to Canada in elements I and/or III. This substitutability may reflect
several factors, such as the Canadian loss of export sales to Mexico and the
United States because (1) each of the two countries becomes a more competitive
supplier because of its falling costs under free trade (due, for example, to its
industries' free access to inexpensive imports from the other); (2) Mexico would
switch some of its purchases from Canada to the higher-cost United States; and
(3) the United States would reverse the switching of imports towards Canada
horn lower-cost source Mexico that happened when the United States signed its
ETA with Canada)7
On the other hand, if the Mexico-U.S. ETA is a complement rather
than a substitute agreement from Canada's point of view, then effects I and III on
outsider Canada will on balance be positive. While it would, in our view, be
overly optimistic to count on this outcome, there are two reasons why it might
occur. One is that resource products --animportant component of Canadian
exports --aremore likely than manufactured goods to complement the growing
Mexican-U.S. trade. However, although resources remain a significant part of
Canadian exports, they no longer dominate, as more than half of Canadian
exports are now manufactured goods, with their higher degree of substitutability.
17 In Viner'sterminology, (2) would be trade diversion and (3) the reversal of
previous trade diversion.
16Accordingly, one has to look to the second reason for the major hope for
complementarity: the increase in income induced by the PTA in the United
States and especially in Mexico,18 with the resulting increase in.their demand
for Canadian exports.
The conclusion so far may be extended and generalized as follows:
PROPOSITION: As a hub-and-spoke system develops around the U.S. hub, a
spoke like Canada canexpectto benefitfromits ownbilateral spoke agreement
withthe United States. However, as the United States then goes on to addnew
spokes,each substitute agreement will hurttheexisting spoke(Canada)while
each complementary agreement will provide fun her benefit to the existing spoke
(Canada). One important hopeforcomplementarity lies in the expanding
income in the hub(U.S.) andin any new spoke (e.g., Mexico) as aresult of
theirbilateral.
FurtherObservations on the Development of a Hub-and-
Spoke System in Steps 1 and 2
If the United States signs a sequence of spoke agreements that are
complements from the Canadian point of view, then Canada will likely benefit
from the expanding prosperity of the hemisphere. On the other hand,suppose
that, for Canada, these new spoke agreements are substitUtes. As the United
18 To illustrate:If, over a period of, say, 10-15years,the Mexicans were able
to cut their productivity gap with the United States by just a quarter, their
income could rise by more than a hundredpercent.
17States addseach newspoke,Canadaloses and sees its benefit fromitsown
originalFTA withthe United States erode. But even in this case, it willstill
paradoxicallybe in Canada's interest to participate as a spoke in this U.S.
centeredsystem rather than to decline. Indeed, the same will remain true even if,
as the United States continues to add spoke agreements throughout the
hemisphere, the Canadian losses come to exceed its gains from its original FTA
with the United States. The same is true for any other spoke: It may lose from
this whole process and therefore wish that it had never taken place; but it will
still have an incentive to participate. The reason for this paradoxical conclusion
is that all a spoke is able to decide is whether it will get the benefits of free trade
with the U.S. hub. If it signs a bilateral with the United States, it gets those
benefits; if it says no, it does not. Its decision has little influence over the U.S.
hub as the United States adds new bilaterals that discriminate against the spoke.
The spoke cannot escape from this problem, whether or not it decides to join the
hub-and-spoke system.
If this is the only way that a spoke can get free trade with the United
States, it will have not only the incentive of benefiting from the expansion of
its trade with the United States as described above, but also the incentive of
avoiding damage to its present trade. For example, Mexico has viewed a
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States as a way of reducing the risk
of being the target of Super-301 or some other form of U.S. unilateral trade
remedy action. This raises the question: Could aggressive U.S. unilateral
policies like Super-301 be used by the United States to put pressure on its
18trading partners to participate in a new, highly discriminatory form of U.S.
bilateralism, namely the development of a U.S-centered hub-and-spoke system?
In our judgment, this is not why these unilateral U.S. policies were introduced;
nonetheless, they could be used in this way, either by inadvertence or design.
Now consider the alternative way for countries in the hemisphere to
liberalize their trade with the United States --thatis, through an expanding
plurilateral FTA. In the simple, three-country North American case that we have
been analyzing, it will now be shown why a U.S. parmer --Canada--canbe
expected to prefer such a trilateral FTA to a hub-and-spoke system.
Step Three: A Canada-Mexico Bilateral FTA, Essentially
Transforming the Hub-and-Spoke System in Step Two
into a Trilateral FTA. Or, How Does a Trilateral FTA
Compare to a Hub-and-Spoke System?
The effects on Canada of this bilateral with Mexico can be shown in
equation (7), as follows:
On the import side, the elimination of the Canadian tariff on
Mexican goods will have three possible effects:
1.Canada will switch some of its import purchasesaway from
lower-cost sources in the ROW to Mexico. (The Canadian import of clothing
from Mexico rather than the Pacific Rim is one expected example.) As the
Canadian domestic price falls there will, following the reasoning leading to
equation (6), be a volume-of-trade benefit based on the degree to which increased
imports from Mexico in IV exceed decreased imports from the ROW in VI.
19There will also be a Canadian terms-of-trade loss in V to the degree that Mexico
is a more expensive source than the ROW.
2.Canada will restore its imports from Mexico that were switched
earlier to the high-cost United States due to the Canada-U.S. PTA, yielding
Canada a terms-of-trade benefit through I. (In that earlier PTA, the United States
alone got preference in the Canadian market; now Mexico also gets it.) Since
these imports from Mexico will now come into Canada duty free, the Canadian
domestic price will fall and Canadian imports will accordingly increase.
Therefore there will also be a volume-of-trade benefit for Canada whose size will
depend on how much the increase in imports from Mexico in IV exceeds the
reduction in imports from the United States in ji.19
3.Finally, Canadian tariff reduction will induce more import
purchases from Mexico in products where Mexico is the least-cost source. This
will cause an additional volume-of-trade benefit for Canada in IV, but an
unfavorable terms-of-trade change in Ill as Canada givesup any favorable terms-
of-trade effect from, its previous tariff against Mexico.
It is not clear how the three conflicting influences on Canada's terms of
trade cited in the three cases above would compare. It would be difficult toargue
19Formally, as in equation (6), the volume-of-trade effect taking into account
both IV and H will be:
(pc- pe)[c M + dzn US]
where the world price pe is the price at which Canada now purchases from
Mexico.
20that the total effect on Canadian welfare of increased imports from Mexico would
be negative, however, since in each of the three cases the volume-of-trade effects
are positive.
Although some ambiguity remains, it is substantially reduced when the
effect on Canadian exports is considered.
On the export side, the effects on Canada would be unambiguously
positive. Canada would both receive a higher price for its exports to Mexico and
sell more as a result of the elimination of the Mexican tariffs. (Notice that the
Mexican tariff removal eliminates the previous discrimination against Canada
that Mexico established when signing an FTA with the United States.20)
Moreover, there would be another favorable effect Canada-Mexico free trade
would guarantee Canadian industry access to duty-free Mexican inputs that would
keep it globally more competitive --inparticular, in expanding its exports to the
ROW and in allowing it to compete more effectively with U.S. industry in the
United States, Canada and elsewhere. Because of the dominance of the United
States in the Canadian trading picture, restoring Canada's competitive position
vis-a-vis the United States in the U.S. market may paradoxically be where much
of the effect on Canada of its trade liberalization with Mexico would be played
out
To sum up: the effects on Canada from its bilateral with Mexico point
to an expectation of net gain. Since this third bilateral would, to a substantial
20Again, following footnote 9, the effects of both the increase in exports and
the higher price received for them would appear in element HI.
21degree, transform a hub-and-spoke into an FTA,21 this implies that for a spoke
such as Canada, a trilateral ETA is preferred to a hub-and-spoke system --with
key reasons being that an ETA alone provides Canadian finns with duty-free
access to inexpensive Mexican inputs and the expanding Mexican market, along
with full escape from discrimination there in competition with U.S. firms.
This conclusion can very simply be illustrated by considering the
limiting case in which all countries in the hemisphere are included in an ETA.
Then Canada would look out on a hemisphere in which it would enjoy tariff-free
trade in all directions, with the expected gains from trade this implies. Compare
this to a hemisphere-wide hub-and-spoke system, in which Canada would see free
trade as it looks to the United States, but face a Byzantine maze of
discriminatory trade restrictions as it looks towards other hemispheric countries.
21 This isnot a precise transformation, since the creation of a full bilateral
ETA would still require an agreement by all three countries on certain issues --
inparticular the reformulation of bilateral rules of origin. Moreover, once the
United States has more than 2 or 3 spoke agreements, transforming such a hub-
and-spoke system into a plurilateral FTA by bilateral agreements among spokes
becomes essentially impossible because of the large number of such agreements
that would be required.
Furthermore, two things could come from a bilateral negotiation that
would not come from U.S.-Mexico and Canada-Mexico bilaterals: First, there
could be a large potential benefit to Canada from a thiateral negotiation, insofar
as Canada would get the same favorable non-tariff access to the U.S. market as
Mexico --forexample, in U.S. government procurement contracts. On the other
hand, a trilateral might increase the likelihood of a reopening of the Canada-U.S.
ETA, which is far more important to Canada than any free trade arrangement
with Mexico. This has been expressed as a concern by Gordon Ritchie, the
former deputy Canadian nde negotiator in the Canada-U.S. ETA (Hill and
Wonnacott, 1991, p. 11). While there is a serious potential problem, it is not
guaranteed that Canada would lose from such a reopening; it is possible that it
might benefit.
22Moreover, what is true for Canada is also true for Mexico or any other
potential U.S. spoke partner down the road, regardless of when it may be
included in the sequence. Each such partner could expect net benefits from its
own bilateral with the United States, but might well be damaged by U.S. spoke
bilaterals with other countries. But whether or not a partner is damaged, it can
be expected to prefer an expanding plurilateral free trade area to a hub-and-spoke
system22
This preference by each U. S. partner for an FTA will be strengthened
in the last section when we go beyond this theory of preferential trading to
consider some of the other effects of a hub-and-spoke system on the participating
countries. But first, consider the view from the U.S; hub.
IV.THE VIEW FROM THE HUB
For the U.S. hub, the analysis yields fewer clear expectations at each
stage than it did for a spoke. Rather than attempting to carefully catalog often
conflicting details of benefits and costs, we will sketch the argument.
A Hub-and-Spoke System
In its existing bilateral FTA with Canada, a key question for the United
States is how its likely terms-of-trade loss as a relatively large country from
giving up its own tariff --i.e.,the flip side of the terms-of-trade benefit acquired
22 Oneimportant reason that other counthes can be expected to take much the
same view as Canada is because, like Canada, they are relatively small when
compared with the United States. Indeed, because they are economically even
smaller than Canada, this role is in fact clearer in their case.
23by Canada --willcompare with its gains from increased trade, including the
benefits it gets from flee access to the Canadian market and from the preferences
it acquires there.
Moreover, for the "large" United States, this continues to be the key
trade-off every time it adds a bilateral with Mexico or any other country in the
hemisphere, all of which are relatively small: How does its terms-of-trade loss
compare to its benefits from increased trade, including those resulting from the
preference it acquires in each spoke market not only in competition with
counthes outside the hemisphere but also in competition with its other spoke
partners within.23
A Hub-and-Spoke System Compared to an FTA
Does the United States prefer a hub-and-spoke system to an F1'A?
Unlike its partners, it could look out over a hub-and-spoke hemisphere and see
free trade in all directions with all the benefits of an FTA inéluding (1) free
market access to all its hemispheric partners and (2) the preference it would get
in each hemispheric market in competition with all counthes outside the
hemisphere. In addition, a hub-and-spoke would provide the United States with
an advantage not available in an ETA --namely,the preference it would get in
eh.spoke market (e.g. Mexico) in competition with all other spokes such as
Canada. Moreover, the fact that it would be the only country in the hemisphere
23 Ofcourse, at each stage the United States faces other costs (e.g., from
switching its import purchases from a lower-cost outside source to its new spoke
partner) and other benefits (e.g., from reversing some of the switching that
occurred previously when it signed on earlier spokes).
24to get free-trade access to all spoke markets would give it a location advantage
over other spokes, with potential tax and other benefits this could imply.
However, other factors would tend to make a plurilateral ETA relatively
more attractive for the United States than a hub-and-spoke system. To illustrate:
because U.S. partners Canada and Mexico would likely acquire higher real
income under a plurilateral ETA, U.S. exports and hence U.S. real income would
tend to be greater.24 There is no clear answer as to which regime the United
States would prefer. Also, there are factors, such as economies of scale, that are
not discussed here that the United States (and its partners) would have to take
into account in comparing the two systems.
V. FURTHER PROBLEMS IN A HUB-AND-SPOKE
SYSTEM
There are several reasons why total hemispheric income would likely be
less in a hub-and-spoke system than in a plurilateral ETA --reasonsthat will
reinforce the preference of each U.S. partner for an ETA, and that may even lead
the U.S. hub, the country most likely to prefer a hub-and-spoke system, to also
judge an ETA superior.
24 The effectson the United States of moving from a hub-and spoke system to
an ETA could be dealt with more formally by examining a U.S. equation similar
to (7), except of course that the roles of Canada and the United States would be
reversed. It is now the United States --theoutsider to the third-stage Canada-
Mexico bilateral —thatwould have to address the question of whether that
bilateral would be a substitute or a complement Higher real income in Canada
and Mexico would make it more likely that the United States would view this
bilateral as a complement and hence prefer an ETA. On the other hand, the U.S.
loss of preference in the markets of Canada and Mexico would make it more
likely that the United States would view the Canada-Mexico bilateral as a
substitute and hence prefer a hub and spoke.
25The Waste of Real Resources in a Hub-and-Spoke System
DuetoHigher Administrative and Transport Costs
The analysis so far applies to a hub-and-spoke system in which the
U.S. hub has consistent bilaterals with all the spokes (i.e., its tariffs and NTBs
aethesameiniradewitheachspoke--not,say,atariffofzeminj
onespoke,and2%with another). Since evensucha consistent system would be
amore complextrading network thanan FTA,there would bea wasteofthe
extratimeandeffortthat management, economists,lawyers, and accountants
would haveto devoteto determining theleast expensive tradeand investment
patternsthroughoutthismaze.Toillustrate,shouldsome direct Brazil-Mexico
tradebe re-routedthroughthe onlyduty-freepath available,i.e.,through the
UnitedStates? While the extra time required to answer such questions would
provide a private payoff to lawyers, economists, and accountants, froma broader
point of view it would be an unnecessary waste of these resources. Moreover
when such a re-routing does take place, it implies a further waste due to higher
transport costs.
All these wastes may escalate if it is no longer assumed that all
bilaterals are consistent.
The Costs or Rent-Seeking in a Hub-and-Spoke System
As a hub-and-spoke system develops, the question arises: which
country will be the next spoke? There is then the possibility of lobbying
pressure by rent-seeking firms in the hub to influence the selection of the next
26country or sequence of countries and the form of the bilateral agreement with
each so as to provide these firms with the best configuration of special
preferences. The argument here is parallel to the traditional one in which rent-
seeking firms seek to establish special benefits from the creation of, say, a
monopoly position. Both preference in a foreign market and a domestic
monopoly position are created by restricting the entry of competitors; in the case
of trade preference described here, the restricted entry is into spoke markets by
competitors from other spokes (and from outside the hemisphere).25 In either
case, rent seeking represents a social waste, though, of course, it may provide a
benefit to the firms that engage in this activity. Moreover, it need not be
limited to firms in the hub; firms in spoke countries and prospective spoke
countries may also engage in rent-seeking attempts to influence the sequencing
of bilaterals.
This means that one oft-cited advantage of a bilateral ETA --itallows
the two countries to tailor an agreement to their own special needs --mustbe
recontlered.. True, this ability to tailor remains an advantage (though not
necessarily a decisive one) of a bilateral over a multilateral negotiation in which
the agenda may be set or even heavily influenced by third countries with other
problems. But it is a disadvantage of a bilateral if it is one of the spoke
Mi ETA, like a hub-and-spoke system, also restricts entry by competitors
from outside the hemisphere. The difference is that an PTA does not restrict
entry by competitors from within the hemisphere and one would expect,
therefore, less intense rent-seeking in an ETA. One would also expect less
administrative and transport cost waste in an ETA because it would be less
complex. It goes without saying that, in comparing the two systems, it is the
difference in any of these wastes that is relevanL
27agreements in a hub-and-spoke system, since the ability to tailor means an
increase in the incentives for rent seeking, and a greater risk of inconsistencies in
the bilaterals.
Problems orManagedTrade: Greater in a Hub-and-
Spoke?
Negotiators may have an incentive to include elements of managed trade
in any ETA, since this may allow them to satisfy two constituencies at once:
(1) the free trade provisions required by the ETA generate support from free
traders, while (2) the managed trade provisions, with their cartel-like, market-
sharing provisions, protect employment and generate support from
protectionists, If a country is comparing a bilateral spoke agreement to joining
an existing FTA, can anything be said about the likelihood of negotiating free
trade provisions versus managed trade provisions?
It is possible for a spoke bilateral to include more &ee trade provisions
than could be achieved in the expansion of an ETA. Indeed, as already noted, one
of the traditionally cited advantages of a bilateral is that greater progress in
liberalizing trade may be possible for two countries than for more than two.
Nonetheless, conceding this, we still, on balance, have a concern that there may
be a greater risk that two countries, in the relative freedom of negotiating a
bilateral, may cartelize markets in managed trade configurations. This risk may
also be greater, the fewer the industries covered. In either respect, the fewer the
players, the easier it may be for cartel-like arrangements to be set up by
negotiators who, recognizing the political resistance to their trade agreement that
28must be overcome, may haveanincentive to neutralize some opposition groups
by providing them with managed trade provisions. True, by protecting existing
producers, managed trade reduces short-run adjustment cost; however, in the long
run, the protection these producers receive may leave them less able to meet
foreign competition, and the whole process of reallocating resources to capture
benefits from freer trade will be deterred.
VI.CONCLUDING REMARKS
In either a North American or Western Hemisphere context in which the
U.S. is, in many goods, the "large country" and other countries are small, the
development of a hub-and-spoke system centered on the United States can be
expected to provide each spoke with real income benefits on signing its own
bilateral agreement with the United States, but gains or losses as the United
States signs bilateral agreements withotherspokes, depending on whether each
new agreement is a complement or substitute.However,in either case a spoke
can be expected to prefer an expanding FFA
There are a number of alternatives besides the polar hub-and-spoke and
trilateral ETA outcomes considered here. For example, there might be a trilateral
core agreement covering issues on which the three countries could agree, plus a
U.S. bilateral on other more contentious issues withoneor eachofthe other
two countries. In this case theresultingagreement would be a combination of
core (FTA) characteristics and bilateral (hub-and-spoke) characteristics --unless
all the bilazerals are on exclusively bilateral issues. An example would be low-
wage service trade along the Mexican-U.S. border, where a U.S.-Mexico bilateral
would not affect Canada in any way and would therefore not have any
discriminatory hub-and-spoke implications. Compare this to a Mexican-U.S.
bilateral agreement on, say, government procurement which clearly could create
discrimination against Canada.
29For the U.S. hub, each spoke agreement willgenerate a net benefit or
loss, dependingheavilyon how its term-of-trade losses as a "large country"
compare to the benefits it receives from its increaed volume of trade and
preferred location. Will the United Statesprefer a hub-and-spoke to an expanding
PTA? If the analysis is limited to the effects of preferential trading--thatis,
preferred access by the U.S. hub to spoke markets --thenthe conclusion is that
the U.S. will prefer a hub-and-spoke system. However, that judgment will be
eroded and perhaps reversed by broader considerations, such as the effect of a hub-
and-spoke system in generating smaller increases in income in spoke markets --
andhence a smaller increase in U.S. exports to these markets; and the
expectation that higher administrative, transportation and rent-seeking wastes iii
a hub-and-spoke system will have a depressing effect on the real income of all
participating countries including the U.S. hub --especiallyif, as is almost
certain, the spoke bilaterals are inconsistent.
As a final note, one might cast the net even wider into somewhat more
speculative territory. Would a hub-and-spoke system encourage a new form of
U.S. "domestic-export protectionism" aimed at protecting U.S. firms against
foreign competition, not just in the domestic market as always, but also in the
markets of spoke countries where U.S. exporters would be protected by
preferential treatment? The problem with such protectionism is that it could
block initiatives by the U.S. administration to further liberalize trade, either in
the GAIl' or by transforming the hub-and-spoke system into a plurilateral PTA.
"Protectionist" U.S. exporters might resist either type of liberalization because it
30would strip them of their special preference in spoke markets. Moreover, this
protectionism might effectively be disguised as support for free trade, since its
proponents could claim that all they would be doing would be to defend an
existing set of U.S. bilateral free trade agreements. The U.S. administration,
traditionally under fire from protectionism in any case, might find it even more
difficult to resist this new and more subtle form. An additional question to
consider is whether, in the development of a hub-and-spoke system, the U.S.
might be perceived as attempting to enlarge its already dominant role in the
hemisphere through a nding structure that would leave hemispheric markets
carved up into a patchwork of what the United States would view as preferences,
but that its partner countries would view as damaging discrimination. Indeed,
such a preferential system could prove not to be sustainable over any significant
period of time.
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